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ABSTRACT
There are complex legal and ethical tradeoffs involved in
using intensiﬁed regulation to bring smoking prevalence
to near-zero levels. The authors explore these tradeoffs
through a lens of health justice, paying particular
attention to the potential impact on vulnerable
populations. The ethical tradeoffs explored include the
charge that heavy regulation is paternalistic; the
potentially regressive impact of heavily taxing a product
consumed disproportionately by the poor; the simple loss
of enjoyment to heavily addicted smokers; the health
risks posed by, for example, regulating nicotine content
in cigarettes—where doing so leads to increased
consumption. Turning to legalistic concerns, the authors
explore whether endgame strategies constitute a form of
‘regulatory taking’; whether endgame strategies can be
squared with global trade/investment laws; whether free
speech rights are infringed by aggressive restrictions on
the advertisement and marketing of cigarettes.
Smoking prevalence in high-income countries has
dropped considerably due to a suite of population-
level strategies: education campaigns, warning
labels, advertising restrictions, clean air laws, age
limits and taxation. Low-income and
middle-income countries are gradually implement-
ing similar measures, and evidence of effectiveness
is emerging.1 This progress risks stalling in double-
digit percentages, at the potential cost of a billion
lives over the coming century, as established mea-
sures reach a point of diminishing returns.2
Consequently, there is growing interest in
‘endgame strategies’, following the full implementa-
tion of existing measures. ‘Endgames’ would shift
regulatory focus to the supply side of the market3:
limiting nicotine content below addictive levels4;
raising pH to un-inhalable levels5; entrusting
tobacco marketing and/or supply to a nonproﬁt
agency, mandated to drive sales down6 7; imposing
a ‘sinking lid’ on the supply of tobacco available
for commercial sale, driving prices upward;8 and
setting a generational cutoff (eg, banning sale to
anyone born after 1999).9 Endgame strategies must
avoid the pitfalls of alcohol prohibition—popular
revolt and underground tobacco markets—and
should not be implemented until prevalence is low
(eg, under 15%), governments are strongly commit-
ted and public support overwhelming.10
ETHICAL TRADEOFFS IN TOBACCO ENDGAMES
Existing tobacco controls encourage prevention and
smoking cessation but respect adult autonomy
while shielding others from the associated harms
and costs. Autonomous decision making is the
norm, notwithstanding evidence of nicotine
dependence.11 Warning labels inform consumers,
clean air laws protect third parties from second-
hand smoke, taxes internalise the social costs of
smoking, while age limits and marketing restric-
tions ostensibly protect minors.
Endgames depart from this paradigm. A gener-
ational cutoff, for example, would (in time) pro-
hibit informed adults from purchasing cigarettes.
Adults, even if well informed, may smoke for per-
sonal reasons—whether to alleviate anxiety, combat
weight gain or simply for pleasure. In most other
contexts, adults are permitted to make harmful
choices that are primarily self-regarding. However,
the case for paternalism—interfering with indivi-
duals’ liberty to protect and promote their best
interests—is particularly powerful in the case of
tobacco control. It has that rare combination of
being uniquely harmful to health and heavily
addictive, with enormous social and economic costs
to families and communities. Most adults initiate
smoking as adolescents12 and now wish they could
quit.13 Given this combination of harms, govern-
ments would never grant regulatory approval if
cigarettes were invented today. Seen through this
lens, endgames are not unjustiﬁed paternalism but
the long-overdue closure of a cavernous gap in
health and safety standards.
Some endgame strategies may trade the interests
of already addicted smokers against the protection
of future generations. Proposals to gradually lower
nicotine content below the addiction thresholds—
guarding younger generations from dependency—
may cause already addicted adults to resort to com-
pensatory smoking, increasing exposure to poisons
and carcinogens.4
Intergenerational tradeoffs are entailed as well in
proposals to raise tobacco taxes to prohibitive
levels or set a sinking lid on tobacco supply. While
teenagers will be deterred by price increases,
addicted smokers—who are disproportionately low
income—may choose to forego essentials (food,
shelter and medicines) to satiate their habit.14 The
intent is that decreased nicotine content and rising
prices will, in the long run, motivate individuals to
quit. Still, government has a duty to mitigate these
costs by making tobacco cessation therapies access-
ible and affordable.
People often smoke as a way of coping with
stress15—a fact that partly explains the grossly
inequitable socioeconomic distribution. As govern-
ments intensify strategies to denormalise tobacco
use, they will further stigmatise and isolate
smokers, threatening their dignity and adding
shame to already hard lives. While this may be
inevitable, it remains troubling. Protecting the
public’s health and blaming individuals who are
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suffering may be hard to separate. However, it is government’s
—and all of society’s—ethical responsibility to show respect and
caring for smokers, even while strictly regulating their access to
harmful products.16
Finally, efforts at reducing overall tobacco prevalence, if
focused solely on aggregate measures, may turn a blind eye to
distributional equity. Suppose that endgame strategies reduced
tobacco prevalence to 5%: higher socioeconomic classes might
decline to 1–2%, with double-digit prevalence among the poor,
less educated or mentally ill. This would exacerbate already
existing, and unconscionable, health disparities. Endgame strat-
egies, therefore, should pay particular attention to the least
advantaged, focusing on equitable distribution of beneﬁts.
LAW AS AN OBSTACLE TO TOBACCO ENDGAMES
The law has been used as a sword and a shield in tobacco
control. Litigation against ‘Big Tobacco’ in the USA culminated
in a Master Settlement Agreement in 1998. The litigation was
transformative, especially in compelling the release of docu-
ments revealing the industry’s dishonesty and aggressive market-
ing tactics. By 2005, the WHO’s Framework Convention on
Tobacco Control (FCTC) enshrined tobacco control strategies
into international law.
More recently, the industry has turned the tables: from
Australia and the USA to Uruguay, the industry has used consti-
tutional law,17 as well as international investment and trade
agreements,18 in an effort to block tobacco controls. With their
very survival at stake, it is to be expected that these legal strat-
egies will be redeployed at the endgame stage.
Property rights
What all endgame strategies have in common is their deliberate
intent to drastically reduce the economic viability of the indus-
try. Most constitutions, as well as bilateral investment treaties,
guarantee corporate property rights, requiring that state ‘acquisi-
tion of property’ must be on ‘just terms’. That was the primary
basis of the industry’s suit against Australia’s plain packaging
legislation, although the High Court roundly rejected the claim
in August 2012.19
Beyond constitutional law, many states have negotiated bilat-
eral investment treaties that have similar guarantees not to
unfairly deprive corporations of their proﬁts. The industry has
challenged Australia’s plain packaging laws, as well as Uruguay’s
mandated health warnings, under investment treaties.20 Both
cases will be decided through international arbitration.
Although the outcome is uncertain, national courts and inter-
national tribunals should rule in favour of the state. In imple-
menting tobacco control, government is exercising the sovereign
authority to protect the public’s health.
Endgame strategies, even more than graphic warnings, will
deprive the tobacco industry of vast corporate proﬁts. It is con-
ceivable that courts would balk at such a complete deprivation
of earning potential. Nevertheless, government should be
entitled to drastically limit, even bar, the industry from proﬁting
by marketing highly dangerous products.
Trade and intellectual property rights
Multinational tobacco companies will also pressure governments
to challenge endgames under international trade agreements.
Multiple legal arguments are available to the industry, including
trade discrimination and deprivation of intellectual property. In
April 2012, for example, the WTO Appellate Body ruled that
the USA discriminated against Indonesia by banning clove-
ﬂavoured cigarettes.21 The 2009 US Family Smoking Prevention
and Tobacco Control Act (FSPTCA) prohibited all ﬂavoured
cigarettes but exempted menthol pending an FDA review. The
Appellate Body found that clove and menthol cigarettes are ‘like
products’. To comply with the ruling, the USA would either
have to allow clove cigarettes onto the market or end the
menthol exemption.
Perhaps the more troublesome trade rule requires states to
respect intellectual property, including trademarks. The Ukraine
and other states, for example, are challenging Australia’s plain
packaging law under this theory. Trade law speciﬁcally allows
states to protect the public’s health, but governments must do so
based on sound science and without unfair discrimination.
Endgame strategies would have to meet this test, demonstrating
that they signiﬁcantly improve the public’s health in ways that
are no more trade restrictive than necessary to achieve their
goals.
Commercial speech
Constitutions frequently safeguard the right to free expression.
Most constitutional courts reserve these safeguards for political,
artistic and social discourse. Yet a few, notably the US Supreme
Court, have developed commercial speech doctrines. The
FCTC, at the insistence of the USA, speciﬁcally preserved states’
rights to refrain from tobacco control where required under
their constitutions. The industry, for example, has successfully
challenged Massachusetts regulations restricting tobacco adver-
tising and sales, ﬁnding that the limits were more extensive than
necessary.22 More recently, a US appellate court struck down
FDA-mandated graphic health warnings as a form of ‘compelled
commercial speech’.23 (However, another federal appeals court
upheld the warnings as valid in principle—the actual images
proposed had not yet been released at the time of trial—suggest-
ing the matter is destined for the Supreme Court.24)
Political speech
Endgame strategies require a hospitable political climate.
Lawmakers in New South Wales (Australia) have attempted to
foster this, by banning political donations from tobacco
entities.25 In the USA, attempts to limit Big Tobacco’s inﬂuence
on lawmakers and public opinion are bound to run into First
Amendment challenges—particularly in light of the Supreme
Court’s 2010 decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission, which afforded constitutional protection to cor-
porations’ political contributions.26
THE FUTURE OF TOBACCO ENDGAMES
Tobacco endgames will face vehement political opposition,
fuelled by industry lobbying. Beyond politics, public health
advocates have to think through the ethical mineﬁelds and inev-
itable legal challenges. The political and legal battles, however
hard, are worth the cost, given the enormous beneﬁts of public
health and economic productivity conferred by a tobacco-free
society.
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